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YOUNGHO CHO, MI-SON KIM, AND YONG CHEOL KIM
Cultural Foundations of Contentious Democracy
in South Korea
What Type of Democracy Do Korean Citizens Prefer?
ABSTRACT
This study takes a cultural approach to examine the unstable and contentious nature
of Korean democracy. Analyzing an original nationwide survey conducted in 2015,
we find that the democratic and participatory culture of the Korean people underlies
Korean democracy. This finding suggests substantial tension between the participa-
tory orientation of the public and Korean representative democracy.
KEYWORDS: Korea, contentious democracy, political culture, modernization,
popular protests
THE CANDLELIGHT PROTESTS OF 2016–17 in South Korea (hereafter, Korea)
surprised scholars of Korean politics and comparative democratization. The
initial demonstrations began with a couple of thousand protesters in Seoul’s
Gwanghwamun Square in late October 2016. However, like a prairie fire,
these demonstrations suddenly led to nationwide anti-government rallies of
more than two million protesters within a month and continued weekly for
four more months. The massive protests forced the legislators of the National
Assembly to impeach President Park Geun-hye. The Constitutional Court
unanimously ruled that President Park had violated the constitution and laws
throughout her time in office and thus her impeachment was just. Recorded
as the largest demonstrations in modern Korean history, five months of
candlelight protests ended with Park’s dramatic downfall, from president
to prisoner.
YOUNGHO CHO is Associate Professor of Political Science at Sogang University, Seoul, South
Korea. MI-SON KIM is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas Rio
Grande Valley, Edinburg, USA. YONG CHEOL KIM (corresponding author) is Professor of Political
Science at Chonnam National University, Gwangju, South Korea. Emails: <yhcho@sogang.ac.kr>,
<mison.kim@utrgv.edu>, <kimyc@chonnam.ac.kr>.
Asian Survey, Vol. 59, Number 2, pp. 272–294. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X.© 2019 by
The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission
to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Reprints and
Permissions web page, https://www.ucpress.edu/journals/reprints-permissions. DOI: https://doi.org/
10.1525/AS.2019.59.2.272.
272
Although popular protests have been an increasing phenomenon since
the 2000s, the latest candlelight protests and subsequent political changes
were so dramatic they raised a number of puzzling questions about Korean
democracy. Surprised by the 2008 anti-US-beef protest, in which a million
people took part, scholars and policymakers tried to probe its meanings
and causes, but the years of 2016 and 2017 further deepened their curiosity
and concerns.
On the one hand, the candlelight protests were widely praised because they
stopped the deconsolidation of Korean democracy driven by the Lee Myung-
bak and Park Geun-hye governments. For instance, Hong-koo Lee, the
former prime minister of Korea, praised “South Korea as a beacon of Asian
democracy,”1 and Ha-Joon Chang, a renowned economist, commented that
“South Koreans worked a democratic miracle.”2 Yascha Mounk stated that
the candlelight protests “can serve as inspiration to defenders of liberal
democracy around the world.”3 To those recalling the pessimistic lament
about Korean democracy over the last decade among leading scholars, these
comments indicated a sea change in Korean politics.4
On the other hand, the candlelight protests again confirmed the gap
between representative institutions and resistant civil society. They revealed
without reserve that the formal representative system of Korean democracy
was dysfunctional. Political parties were unable to check President Park’s
wrongdoings—or to resolve public discontent, while operating in confusion
between Park and the protesters. Pointing to these features—active social
movements and ineffectual representative institutions—Sunhyuk Kim called
Korean politics “contentious democracy,” and Yoonkyung Lee termed it
“democracy without parties.”5
1. Hong-koo Lee, “South Korea as a Beacon of Asian Democracy,” East Asia Institute, Sep-
tember 21, 2017.
2. Ha-Joon Chang, “South Koreans Worked a Democratic Miracle. Can They Do It Again?”
New York Times, September 14, 2017.
3. Yascha Mounk, The People vs. Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018): 185.
4. Jang-Jip Choi, Democracy after Democratization: The Korean Experience (Stanford, CA: Shor-
enstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2012); Hyug Baeg Im, “Better Democracy, Better Economic
Growth? South Korea,” International Political Science Review 32:5 (2011): 579–98.
5. Sun Hyuk Kim, “‘Contentious Democracy’ in South Korea,” Taiwan Journal of Democracy
8:2 (2012): 51–61; Yoonkyung Lee, “Democracy without Parties? Political Parties and Social Move-
ments for Democratic Representation in Korea,” Korea Observer 40:1 (2009): 27–52.
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Why has this civic activism persisted and increased in Korea despite the
country’s economic miracle and the institutional advancement of represen-
tative democracy over the past three decades? To the extent that few scholars
expected such large-scale protests in 2008 and 2016–17, this has remained an
ongoing and timely question about the nature of Korean democracy. Leading
scholars from diverse approaches have struggled to answer theoretically why
the contentious style of Korean democracy has been an enduring feature.6
This study is an empirical effort to answer why Korean citizens set aside
representative organizations and take part in social movements. Prior studies
have focused on the structural and temporal causes of democratic instability
in Korea. However, there has been a lack of empirical studies of why so many
citizens are willing to be main actors of contentious democracy.
To this end, we take a cultural approach to shed new light on why Korean
democracy is contentious from the perspective of ordinary people. In partic-
ular, the study attempts to unravel the types of democracy Korean citizens
have in mind. If democracy is the dominant concept with which ordinary
people interpret and evaluate their politics, how they conceptualize democracy
influences the nature of the democratic politics in which they live.7 Because
people in different countries have different orientations toward democracy,
their democratic or non-democratic attitudes can explain the dynamics of new
democracies.8
How do Korean citizens conceive democracy? What type of democracy do
Koreans prefer? Do they advocate participatory forms of governing or accept
representative ones?9 To answer these questions, we conducted an original
6. Choi, Democracy after Democratization; Kim, “‘Contentious Democracy’”; Yoonkyung Lee,
“Diverging Patterns of Democratic Representation in Korea and Taiwan,” Asian Survey 54:3 (2014):
419–44; Ho Chul Sonn, Chotbul hyokmyonggwa 2017 cheje [Candlelight revolution and the 2017
regime] (Seoul: Sogang University Press, 2017).
7. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, Civic Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1963); Christian Welzel, Freedom Rising (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
8. Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and Its Alternatives
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
9. As an overarching concept, modern democracy includes several political ideas such as rep-
resentative government, mass participation, regular elections, rule of law, popular sovereignty, and
civil liberties. These ideas are not always harmonious, and they often conflict with one another.
Depending on which idea someone emphasizes, different forms of democracy can be identified.
Comparative scholars have found that two practical forms of democracy are in tension in terms of the
political process of decision-making: representative democracy and participatory democracy. The
former stresses the role of elected representatives, whereas the latter emphasizes the necessity of
citizens’ participation in political processes beyond regular elections.
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nationwide survey in the summer of 2015: empirical analysis of the data shows
that most Koreans demand participatory democracy. They think that
national referenda are needed and that political participation should be more
expansive. Only a small minority agree that national affairs should be deter-
mined by elected officials, and about a third of Korean citizens are not
supportive of democracy at all. These results suggest that Korean democracy
is by and large composed of participatory democrats, and the cultural foun-
dation of representative democracy is shallow. Accordingly, the latest candle-
light protests can be explained as challenges by participatory democrats to the
authoritarian-style governance of the Park Geun-hye government. These
findings also raise a question about the relationship between modernization
and stable democracy in the non-Western world, and have important implica-
tions for the political stability of new democracies.
LITERATURE REVIEW ON CONTENTIOUS DEMOCRACY IN
SOUTH KOREA
As Ivan Krastev aptly pointed out,10 the transition from “politics to protest” has
become an increasing phenomenon in both new democracies and transitioning
countries.11 Korea is not an exception. However, academic discourse about the
contentious nature of Korean democracy did not emerge in earnest until the
massive candlelight vigils of 2008. Before then, Korea had been regarded as an
exemplary case of successful third-wave democracies. The 2008 protests broke
the illusion of the successful consolidation of Korean democracy.
Before 2008, many scholars had evaluated Korean democracy positively,
with only a small minority holding critical views. The positive assessment
stemmed from its institutional development. For example, Kim Young
Sam, the first civilian president (1993–97), successfully purged a clique of
politically ambitious and authoritarian army officers and established
civilian control over the military. He also expanded the electoral participa-
tion of the public, allowing them to elect members of both the central and
local governments. After the first peaceful power transfer, in 1998, to Kim
Dae Jung, the opposition leader and renowned democratic activist,
Byung-Kook Kim stated that “by any standard South Korea was a case of
10. Ivan Krastev, “From Politics to Protest,” Journal of Democracy 25:4 (2014): 5.
11. Thomas Carothers and Richard Youngs, The Complexities of Global Protests (Washington,
DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015).
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success.”12 Moreover, because Korea met Huntington’s two-turnover test of
democratic consolidation by electing Lee Myung-bak of the conservative
party in 2007, Chaibong Hahm declared that “South Korea’s democracy is
consolidated in the maximalist sense.”13 In assessing East Asian democra-
cies, Larry Diamond declared that “Korea can be now considered consol-
idated and essentially irreversible.”14
Despite these institutional advancements, the 2008 protests revealed the
unstable nature of Korean democracy, and the 2016–17 protests reaffirmed
this pattern: very strong civic activism in juxtaposition with weak represen-
tative institutions. Why have so many citizens been engaged in social move-
ments on a massive scale, while the political parties remained hesitant and
unable to resolve national issues?
Many scholars have explored the question, focusing on structural and tem-
poral factors. One dominant line of thought finds the answer primarily in the
lingering authoritarian legacy. Yoonkyung Lee, for instance, contends that
Korean authoritarianism was personalistic rather than party-based, and this left
both political parties and civil society excluded from the core of politics.15 This
tradition has left the formal political system feeble, which in turn has motivated
civil society to play a vital role at every critical moment in the nation’s progress
toward democratization.16 The conflictual relationship between state and soci-
ety has not changed much, even since the democratic transition. This approach
views the main issue as party failure. Parties failed to expand their social bases
and channel diverse social interests effectively into government action.17 In
12. Byung-Kook Kim, “Party Politics in South Korea’s Democracy: The Crisis of Success,” in
Larry Diamond and Byung-Kook Kim (eds.), Consolidating Democracy in South Korea (Boulder:
Lynn Rienner, 2000): 53.
13. Chaibong Hahm, “South Korea’s Miraculous Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 19:3
(2008): 129.
14. Larry Diamond, “East Asia amid the Receding Tide of the Third Wave of Democracy,” paper
presented at the conference, Democracy in East Asia and Taiwan in Global Perspective, Taipei, August
24–25, 2011, <http://www.asianbarometer.org/publications/9047d4415457a0784a8673ab30b47f17.
pdf>. International institutes confirmed this positive evaluation. For example, Freedom House rated
South Korea partially free in 1987 but free in 2008; political rights and civil liberties improved from 4 to
1.5, on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is the most democratic kind of regime and 7 is the most authoritarian.
In 2010, the Economist Intelligence Unit described Korea as a member of the league of full democracies
and placed it at the highest level in Asia, above Japan.
15. Lee, “Diverging Patterns.”
16. Kim, “Party Politics.”
17. Lee, “Democracy without Parties?”; Jennifer S. Oh, “Strong State and Strong Civil Society in
Contemporary South Korea,” Asian Survey 52:3 (2012): 528–49.
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short, the persistence of conflictual civic activism in Korea is due to the
authoritarian legacy, which allows presidents to wield enormous power and
marginalizes the legislature and parties.
Like most historical and structural studies, this approach has trouble
explaining the development of social movements since the 2000s. Though the
state–society relationship remains as conflictual as before, the recent social
movements have been more individualistic and spontaneous than those in the
late decades of the 20th century, which were mostly organization-driven. The
2002 anti-US candlelight vigil and the 2004 anti-impeachment protest dem-
onstrated a new spontaneity in social movements in Korea. And both the 2008
and the 2016–17 protests were initiated and led by individuals rather than social
movement organizations. Civic organizations, labor unions, and social move-
ment organizations joined the masses later, to help coordinate these voluntary
and spontaneous demonstrations.
In this sense, this historical approach has trouble accounting for how the
organized civic activism of the past evolved its spontaneous quality in the
2000s. Due to this limitation, some researchers have attempted actor-centric
explanations. For example, Cho and Park argued that the post-materialistic
young generation drove the 2008 candlelight vigils and that Korean democracy
had experienced a “silent revolution,”18 to borrow Ronald Inglehart’s term.19
Kap Yoon Lee identifies characteristics of the participants: many of them were
from the Jeolla region, ideologically progressive, and young.20 Lee concludes
that the 2008 candlelight protest was caused by citizens’ dissatisfaction with the
LeeMyung-bak government, reflecting the existing electoral cleavages in Korea.
Political economists, on the other hand, take the recent large-scale social
protests to be resistance to a series of neoliberal reforms that have been
introduced in Korea since the late 1990s.21 According to them, these reforms
18. Kisuk Cho and Hye Yun Park, “Gwangjangui jungchiwa munhwajok chungdol” [Politics of
agora and the clash of culture: an empirical analysis of the 2008 candlelight vigil], Hanguk jongchi
hakhwebo [Korean Political Science Review] 42:4 (2008): 243–68.
19. Ronald Inglehart, Silent Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977).
20. Kap Yun Lee, “Chotbul jiphwe chamyojaui ingu/sahwehakjok tuksung mit jongchijok
sunghyanggwa taedo” [Social and demographic characteristics and political orientation of partici-
pants in the candlelight protest of 2008], Hanguk jongdang hwebo [Korean Party Studies Review] 9:1
(2010): 95–120.
21. Seung-Ook Lee, Sook-Jin Kim, and Joel Wainwright, “Mad Cow Militancy: Neoliberal
Hegemony and Social Resistance in South Korea,” Political Geography 29:7 (2010): 359–69; Sonn,
Candlelight Revolution.
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have exacerbated inequality and economic insecurity, and thus social discon-
tent. This chain of effects is the driving force behind the recent protests,
contributing to the instability of Korean democracy.
These actor-centric studies have identified characteristics of the main par-
ticipants in recent protests, but they also have limitations. For instance, Cho
and Park’s post-materialist thesis is an overstatement, given that the propor-
tion of Korean post-materialists has been consistently low compared with
other affluent democracies since the first World Values Survey in 1981.22
Concerning Lee’s argument regarding preexisting electoral cleavages,23 the
2016–17 protesters do not seem to fit, as they are not distinguished from non-
participants by region, generation, or even ideology.24 Also, the political
economy arguments lack validity in explaining the contentious nature of
Korea democracy because the main participants of the 2016–17 protests were
not socioeconomically marginalized groups or individuals but well-educated,
middle-class citizens.
In sum, since the 2008 anti-US-beef protest there has been considerable
scholarly debate over the unstable nature of Korean democracy. Scholars
have reached a consensus that its instability is characterized by feeble
representative politics and strong civic activism. The 2016–17 candlelight
protest reaffirmed this view. Although previous studies, structural and
actor-centric, provide insights into the phenomenon, this article contends
that they do not pay adequate attention to the general public as an inde-
pendent variable for explaining civic activism and Korea’s contentious
democracy. Therefore, this article aims to investigate how ordinary Koreans
envision democracy and to uncover the cultural foundation of Korea’s
contentious democracy.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY AS
A REGIME AND AS A GOVERNING FORM
Cultural studies on Korean democracy are not rare. As a representative scholar,
Doh Shin has consistently shown that Korean democracy is not culturally
22. Cho and Park, “Politics of Agora.”
23. Lee, “Social and Demographic Characteristics.”
24. Jiho Lee, “‘Park Geun-hye chotbul,’ nuga ue chamyohatna: Chamyohangdong mohyunggwa
chamyotaedo mohyungui bigyo” [Who and why participated in the 2017 candlelight protest?],
Hanguk Jongchi Yonggu [Journal of Korean Studies] 26:2 (2017): 75–103.
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embedded in the mass political culture, thereby slowing its consolidation.25
According to him, the Korean people are very idealistic about democracy, but
they are ill-prepared in practical terms to appreciate the complexity of modern
representative democracy. And Samuel Huntington speculates that it is diffi-
cult for Korea to develop liberal democracy because of the country’s strong
legacies of Confucianism.26
However, these points are only partially useful, because stating that the
consolidation of Korean democracy is sluggish is different from positing that
Korean democracy is contentious in nature. Incomplete democracy can be
contentious or it can be silent, depending on various factors. To better
understand the nature of post-transitional politics in new democracies, it is
necessary to explore how ordinary people view democracy and envision it as
a governing form in practice.
How do we discern public attitudes toward democracy? Analytically, past
studies of political culture in new democracies have assessed whether ordinary
people prefer democracy over authoritarianism and how supportive they are
of democratic values.27 On the other hand, cultural studies of advanced
democracies have investigated whether citizens support representative forms
of national decision-making or participatory forms.28
Given that the political environment differs drastically between new and
established democracies, this division of labor in cultural studies is under-
standable and in some sense desirable.29 It is important to note that most
citizens in new democracies lack democratic experience, and often the
competition between pro-democratic and authoritarian groups defines the
25. Doh Shin, Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea (New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1999); Doh Shin, “The Deconsolidation of Liberal Democracy in Korea: Exploring its
Cultural Roots,” Korea Observer 49:1 (2018): 107–36.
26. Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and
the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1996).
27. Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes, and E. Gyimah-Boadi, Public Opinion, Democracy, and
Market Reform in Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Rose et al., Democracy and
Its Alternatives; Shin, Mass Politics and Culture.
28. Nicholas Allen and Sarah Birch, “Process Preferences and British Public Opinion,” Political
Studies 63:2 (2015): 390–411; Russell Dalton, Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004); John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
29. Rose et al., Democracy and Its Alternatives.
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major electoral cleavage. In contrast, such authoritarian legacies and polit-
ical struggle at the regime level are in the past of advanced democracies.
In studying Koreans’ attitudes toward democracy, however, we contend that
both analytical approaches are necessary, for two reasons. On the practical level,
the general attitude toward democracy at the regime level remains relevant
because Korea is an incomplete democracy and political parties still compete
primarily along the former pro-democracy (progressive) versus former author-
itarian (conservative) dimension.30 But it is also imperative to ask Korean
people whether they prefer representative or participatory forms of democracy,
because advanced and practiced representative institutions have emerged over
the last three decades and the country is one of the world’s most modernized
societies. According to the cognitive mobilization thesis of Russell Dalton,31
Koreans should be sophisticated enough to demand participatory democracy
because of their high educational attainment, political interest, and wealth.
On the theoretical level, the distinction between public attitudes toward
democracy and particular forms of democracy is important. Modern democ-
racy has developed as a practical combination of representative government and
popular sovereignty over the last several centuries. As Dahl and many other
scholars point out, representative politics was established before mass partici-
pation in elections was allowed as a method of exercising popular sovereignty.32
Because liberal democratic forces developed contested politics of represen-
tatives and allowed mass participation in the late-nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, modern democracy is by nature elite-oriented and hierarchical. In
a division of political labor, modern democracy grants representatives author-
ity over national affairs, and ordinary citizens hold political rights to elect
them. Therefore, modern democracy can be understood as governance by
representatives on behalf of electors. Owing to this feature of modern democ-
racy, Almond and Verba pointed out that in the civic culture of a stable
democracy, mass political participation is not only active but should be mixed
with passivity and deference to authority, allowing elected representatives to
deal with national affairs at their discretion.33
30. Choi, Democracy after Democratization; Shin, “Deconsolidation.”
31. Dalton, Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices.
32. Robert Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971); Huntington, Third
Wave; David Stasavage, “Representation and Consent,” Annual Review of Political Science 19:1 (2016):
145–62.
33. Almond and Verba, Civic Culture: 5–8.
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As steady economic development and increased education have produced
cognitively mobilized citizens over the last half century, scholars of Western
democracies have naturally been interested in whether people are supportive
of the representative form or a new, participatory form.34 Likewise, we are
interested in what specific form of democracy Korean citizens prefer. Since the
1987 democratic transition, Korea has successfully introduced representative
institutions of the West. Given modernization as well as the advancement of
democratic institutions, it would be valid to ask whether ordinary Koreans
endorse politics via representatives or advocate participatory methods.
Building on this analytical distinction, we examine Koreans’ preference
for democracy over authoritarianism as a regime and their attitudes toward
representative versus participatory democracy as a form of governing.35
Figure 1 illustrates a typology of citizens combining these two dimensions.
At the regime level, depending on whether individuals support democracy
over authoritarianism, there are two types: democrats and non-democrats.
Democrats are in full support of democracy over authoritarianism as a regime
and acknowledge the legitimacy of democracy at the regime level. Non-
democrats do not fully endorse democracy and view authoritarian alterna-
tives as favorable.
Regarding forms of democracy at the practical level, there are also two
types: those who support representative democracy and those who give more
figure 1. Typology of Support for Democracy and Governing Form in South Korea
Support for 
Democracy
Democrats Non-Democrats
Representative 
Democrats
Participatory
Democrats
Representative
Non-Democrats
Populist
Non-Democrats
Support for 
Governing Form
SOURCE: By authors
34. Sonia Alonso, John Keane, and Wolfgang Merkel, Future of Representative Democracy (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Dalton, Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices; Todd
Donovan and Karp Jeffrey, “Popular Support for Direct Democracy,” Party Politics 12:5 (2006):
671–88; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy.
35. Youngho Cho and Yong Cheol Kim, “Hanguk minjujuui bulanjongui munhwajok giban”
[Cultural foundation of Korean democracy’s instability], Hanguk jongchi hakhwebo [Korean Political
Science Review] 51:5 (2017): 5–28.
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credit to participatory democracy. The former agree on the mechanism of
delegation—citizens delegating decision-making authority to elected officials.
The latter consider that citizens’ direct participation in decision-making is
preferable and should be expanded. Combining these two dimensions, we can
identify four distinct types of citizens: representative democrats, participatory
democrats, representative non-democrats, and populist non-democrats.
Representative democrats support democracy over authoritarianism and think
elected representatives should have authority over national affairs. To the
extent that they are committed to democracy but acknowledge a division of
political labor between politicians and citizens, they are close to the “allegiant
citizens” of Almond and Verba’s civic culture model.36 Participatory democrats
prefer democracy to authoritarianism but also demand participatory reforms.
According to recent cultural studies of democracy, critical and assertive citizens
are the ones who move democratic quality forward across democratic polities.37
The participatory democrats of this study are similar to these citizens. Repre-
sentative non-democrats hesitate to support democracy but endorse the author-
ity of representatives over national affairs. They think democracy is not
suitable for Korea and accept the elite-driven decision-making process by
generally deferring to elected representatives in political matters.
Populist non-democrats are interesting because they want to use mass par-
ticipation to restore authoritarianism rather than democracy. This type is not
rare in Korean history. For example, President Rhee Syngman, the founding
father and civilian dictator of Korea, mobilized the masses in elections to
buttress his rule in the 1950s. Throughout the 1960s, Park Chung-hee was
active in mobilizing the masses for his authoritarian and centralized regime.
Even after he declared martial law in 1972, calling it “Korean-style democ-
racy,” he used state resources to mobilize grass-roots meetings at the village
level while suppressing representative institutions such as elections, the
National Assembly, and mass media.38 Therefore, it is not surprising that
some Koreans hold such “authoritarian nostalgia.”39
36. Almond and Verba, Civic Culture.
37. Russell Dalton and Christian Welzel, The Civic Culture Transformed (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2014); Pippa Norris, Democratic Deficit (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2011).
38. Jungmin Seo and Sungmoon Kim, “Civil Society under Authoritarian Rule,” Korea Journal
55:1 (2015): 59–85.
39. Yu-tzung Chang, Yun-han Chu, and Chong-Min Park, “Authoritarian Nostalgia in Asia,”
Journal of Democracy 18:3 (2007): 66.
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This framework of four citizen types can make an important contribution
to the literature of Korean politics and new democracies. To date, public
opinion studies on democratization have heavily focused on public support
for democracy over authoritarianism at the regime level.40 They are effective
in revealing a shallow democratic reservoir in non-Western countries as
a barrier to democratic consolidation. However, this practice is limited in
shedding light on what kind of democratic politics emerges in new democ-
racies and how democracy is practiced in them.
Overall, since existing analytical frameworks offer limited information
about why Korea has faced confrontational challenges from massed citizens,
we attempt to consider popular support for specific forms of democratic
governance—representative versus participatory at the practical level—in
understanding the contentious nature of Korean democracy. With this
framework, we provide an empirical analysis to reveal the cultural foundation
of contentious democracy in Korea.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: WHAT TYPE OF DEMOCRACY DO
KOREANS SUPPORT?
Is democracy the only game in town in the minds of Korean citizens? Do
Koreans support the idea of delegating authority and decision-making power
to elected officials? Simply put, what type of democracy do they support? To
answer these questions, we conducted a nationwide survey in August 2015
and asked 1,300 respondents for their views on democracy and politics
through computer-assisted telephone interviewing.
To assess Koreans’ support for democracy at the regime level, we first
implemented two widely used measures: preferability of democracy and its
suitability in Korea.41 Based on Linz’s idea that democracy is hard to break
down when citizens are attitudinally more attached to it than to authoritar-
ianism, we designed questions for each measure as follows.42 To assess the
40. Bratton et al., Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform; Rose et al., Democracy and Its
Alternatives.
41. Bratton et al., Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform; Chong-Min Park and Yun-
han Chu, “Trends in Attitudes toward Democracy in Korea and Taiwan,” in New Challenges for
Maturing Democracies in Korea and Taiwan, edited by Larry Diamond and Gi-Wook Shin (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2014):259–82; Shin, Mass Politics and Culture.
42. Juan Linz, Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1978). We also surveyed public attitudes toward military dictatorship and strongman
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relative preferability of democracy to authoritarianism, we asked: “With
which of the following statements do you agree most? (1) Democracy is
always preferable to any other kind of government; (2) Under certain situa-
tions, a dictatorship is preferable; (3) For people like me, it does not matter
whether we have a democratic government or non-democratic government.”
We also asked respondents to rate whether democracy is suitable or unsuit-
able for Korea.
By combining these two questions, we identify three types of individuals
with varying degrees of democratic support: democrats, hybrids, and author-
itarians. Democrats express a firm preference for democracy over its alterna-
tives and believe it is suitable for Korea. Hybrids are reluctant to agree with
either preferability of democracy over authoritarianism or its suitability for
Korea. Authoritarians reject both. Thus, the first type is fully supportive of
democracy, and the other two types are partially and completely unsuppor-
tive, respectively.
To measure citizens’ attitudes toward representative or participatory
forms of democratic practice, we employed two questions. The first was,
“Which of the following three do you think is a better way of deciding
important policies of state? (1) Elected representatives decide with profes-
sional bureaucrats; (2) Elected representatives decide with parties through
public hearings; (3) People participate and decide, for instance, through
a referendum.” The second was, “With which of the following statements
do you agree most? (1) Opportunities for electoral and political participation
should be reduced from the current level; (2) Opportunities for electoral and
political participation should be maintained at the current level; (3) Oppor-
tunities for electoral and political participation should be increased from the
current level.”
Regarding the operationalization of public attitudes toward participatory
versus representative forms of democratic governing, it should be noted that
consensus has not been reached in the literature.43 In the European context,
because Switzerland is an exemplary case of direct democracy, some research-
ers use it as a reference point, asking whether the country under study needs
-
authoritarianism. The results are similar to that for suitability of democracy. Whether we use
authoritarian rejection or suitability, the results reported in this study do not change.
43. Kathryn VanderMolen, “Stealth Democracy Revisited,” Political Research Quarterly 70:3
(2017): 687–98.
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reform to move toward Swiss direct democracy.44 Others conceptualize par-
ticipatory citizens as those who disagree with the questions of Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse in Stealth Democracy.45
However, it should be considered in this case that Korean democracy takes
a strict representative form, and direct and participatory methods are not
widely used. To adapt to this context, we asked respondents how much they
prefer participatory democracy in comparison to the current practice of
representative democracy. Combining the two questions, we identify three
types of citizens: participatory, partially participatory, and representative.
Participatory citizens think a referendum is necessary (response 3) and polit-
ical participation should be increased (3). Representative citizens endorse the
current practice (2) or agree that political participation should be reduced and
elected leaders should decide national affairs (1). Partially participatory citizens
demand more participation (3) in one of the two questions.
Do Koreans support democracy over authoritarianism? If so, do they
prefer the current representative form, introduced and practiced over the last
three decades, or do they demand participatory reforms? About 70% say that
democracy is always preferred to any other kind of government (Table 1).
table 1. South Koreans’ Support for Democracy and Governing Form
Support for Democracy
Preferability Suitability Democrats Hybrids Authoritarians
69.9% 85.9% 65.3% 26.0% 8.7%
Support for Participatory and Representative Forms of Governing
Participation in
government decisions,
such as by referendum
More opportunities
for elections and
participation Participatory
Partially
participatory Representative
52.2% 59.1% 35.2% 41.4% 23.4%
SOURCE: By authors
44. Russell Dalton, Wilhelm Burklin, and Andrew Drummond, “Public Opinion and Direct
Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 12:4 (2001):141–54; Donovan and Karp, “Popular Support for
Direct Democracy.”
45. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy; Allen and Birch, “Process Preferences.”
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Although not reported in the table, about 20% say that authoritarianism is
sometimes preferable in certain situations, and the other 10% are ambiguous
or indifferent between democracy and authoritarianism. Public endorsement
of the suitability of democracy is much higher than that of preferability. An
overwhelming majority (86%) said that democracy is suitable for Korea.
Our findings are consistent with other recent studies. Park and Chu,
analyzing the Asian Barometer Survey from 1996 to 2011, find that Koreans’
unconditional support for democracy has risen in recent years.46 It reached
66% in 2011, whereas it was as low as 43% in 2006, and there have been
fluctuations since the late 1990s. They also find that the proportion of those
who view democracy as suitable for Korea was below 70% in the 1990s, but
exceeded 80% in 2011. We see slightly higher levels of both preferability and
suitability of democracy than those from the 2011 Asian Barometer Survey.
This trend of democratic support among the Korean electorate suggests that
new generations socialized after the democratic transition accept democracy
as a legitimate regime and that authoritarianism has difficulty taking social
root among educated people.47
However, as our data indicate, this ongoing democratic cultural evolution
does not mean that Korea is a complete democracy. When the preferability
and suitability measures are combined, more than one-third of the respon-
dents (34.7%) are hybrids who did not either consider democracy preferable
to authoritarianism or find it suitable for Korea. Only 65% are unconditional
supporters of democracy. Strikingly, about one-tenth (8.7%) turn out to be
authoritarians who reject democracy and judge it unsuitable for Korea.
What specific forms of practicing democracy does the Korean electorate
support? As Coppedge and colleagues suggest, democracy can be organized
practically in various ways with the basic conditions for democracy being met.48
For instance, a polity can take on a more or a less participatory form, along the
46. Park and Chu, “Trends in Attitudes.”
47. Russell Dalton and Doh Shin, “Growing up Democratic: Generational Change in East Asian
Democracies,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 15:3 (2014): 345–72.
48. Michael Coppedge et al., “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach,”
Perspectives on Politics 9:2 (2011): 247–67. Political support follows various forms of democracy and
authoritarianism. Some examples include participatory, social, liberal, and illiberal democrats and
non-democrats. Tianjian Shi, Cultural Logic of Politics in Mainland China and Taiwan (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2014); Tom Ulbricht, “Perceptions and Conceptions of Democracy:
Applying Thick Concepts of Democracy to Reassess Desires for Democracy,” Comparative Political
Studies 51:11 (2018):1387–1440.
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participatory–representative spectrum. As political discontent has increased
across affluent Western democracies, scholars have started to question whether
representative democracy is still legitimate or whether it is in crisis owing to the
participatory aspirations of massed citizens.49 This debate is ongoing, but little
is known about whether new democracies follow such a trend.
Our survey shows that Korean democracy is not different from advanced
democracies in that it is also faced with increasing participatory aspirations of
massed citizens. For instance, 52% of the respondents agree that major
national affairs should be determined directly by mass participation such as
a referendum, and 59% believe that more participatory opportunities should
be offered to the people. Although not reported in the table, only 26% think
that elected representatives should be the ones who decide national affairs,
along with professional bureaucrats. The rest (22%) prefer the status quo,
whereby representatives make decisions in partnership with parties and
through public hearings. Regarding political participation, about 12% say
that participation should be restricted, and 29% say it should be maintained
at the current level, while the rest believe it should be increased. In short, our
data indicate that most Koreans disagree with the current form of represen-
tative democracy but aspire to participatory democracy, demanding more
mass participation in politics.
With these two dimensions considered together, those strictly adhering to
a representative form of governing are the smallest minority, at 23%. Citizens
with fully participatory orientations make up 35% of the respondents, and
those supportive of only one dimension of the two constitute 41%. Because
the fully and the partially participatory citizens are both against the current
practice of Korean representative democracy, they can be considered
“revisionists.” Our finding that most Koreans endorse participatory reforms
is similar to the trend in the advanced democracies.50
It seems that most Koreans are not satisfied with the current system of
political decision-making and political participation. Reflecting the partic-
ularity of Korean politics, as Choi points out, political decision-making on
national issues has been carried out by a strong president in an exclusive
way, obviously marring the checks-and-balances system and the rule of
49. Alonso, Keane, and Merkel, Future of Representative Democracy; Dalton, Democratic Chal-
lenges, Democratic Choices.
50. Dalton et al., “Public Opinion and Direct Democracy”; Donovan and Karp, “Popular
Support for Direct Democracy.”
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law.51 Electoral participation is strictly regulated by theNational Election Law,
and freedom of expression has been restricted by the government’s abuse of
various laws, such as the National Security Law52 and the National Law on
Assembly and Demonstration, under the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye
governments.53 Those laws neither exist nor are abused in advanced democra-
cies. These results imply that Korean representative democracy has failed to
satisfy the democratic standards of massed citizens.
What kind of democracy do Korean citizens support? Which types of
democrats and non-democrats are more prevalent? To answer these ques-
tions, we dichotomize the two dimensions of support for representative
democracy. In particular, concerning the first dimension—support for
democracy at the regime level—we categorize the respondents into two
groups, democrats and non-democrats. Non-democrats are operationalized
by combining hybrids and authoritarians, which both reject the current state
of Korean democracy as a legitimate regime. With regard to support for forms
of democratic governing, we code fully participatory and partially participa-
tory citizens (named “revisionists” above) as participatory, and the rest as
representative.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the four types of Korean citizens accord-
ing to their support for democracy as a regime (democrats vs. non-democrats)
and their preference for governing forms (representative vs. participatory).
Participatory democrats (52%) outnumber the other three types combined
(48%). Only 14% are representative democrats, who unconditionally support
democracy as a regime and acknowledge the leading role of elected officials in
ruling national affairs. This clearly indicates that the current state of Korean
representative democracy is incongruent with the Korean public attitudes
toward democracy.
51. Choi, Democracy after Democratization.
52. The National Security Law was enacted on the basis of the public safety law of Japanese
colonial rule when Korea was founded in 1948. This law was designed to remove communists as well
as associations and activities related to North Korea in the name of protecting the liberal democratic
order. Its scope was expanded in the authoritarian period. During this period, the law was widely
abused to restrict the civil liberties of citizens and oppress opposition party leaders and democratic
activists. Even after the 1987 democratic transition, this law was not changed. Although its appli-
cation has been moderated, the United Progressive Party, which had five seats in the National
Assembly, was disbanded by this law in 2014.
53. Stephan Haggard and Jong-Sung You, “Freedom of Expression in South Korea,” Journal of
Contemporary Asia 45:1 (2015): 167–79.
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It is apparent that the participatory revisionists in Korean democracy come
from two directions. First, it is participatory democrats who constitute the
vast majority of the revisionist group. They are considered the driving force
for further reforms of Korean democracy. Second, there are the populist non-
democrats. This group neither endorses democracy as a legitimate regime nor
accepts the concept of representative government. We conclude that Korean
democracy is challenged by two cultural cleavages: democracy versus author-
itarianism, and participatory versus representative forms of governing.
What do our findings imply for the contentious nature of Korean democ-
racy? Our survey was conducted about a year before the 2016–17 candlelight
protests erupted. Because we included questions about forms of governing,
our study explored a new dimension of the mass political culture behind
Korean democracy. The results reported here indicate that Korean democracy
is pressured by strong participatory democrats on the one hand and populist
non-democratic aspirations on the other. Both groups are participatory, but
they have completely different goals.
In the 2016–17 protests, ordinary Koreans were united against the Park
Geun-hye government, beyond the traditional cleavages of Korean politics
defined by ideologies and regions. During the middle of the candlelight pro-
tests, however, tens of thousands of elderly, radical conservatives organized
counter-candlelight and anti-impeachment rallies in support of Park Geun-
hye. The “national flag” (taegukgi) protesters blamed political parties and the
figure 2. Prevalence of Four Types of Support for Democracy and Governing Form in
South Korea
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SOURCE: By authors
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National Assembly for their inability and unwillingness to rescue President
Park from her predicament. They demanded that she be immediately released
from prosecution—and that the army rise up, the National Assembly be
dissolved, and martial law be imposed, to restore order in Korean society.54
The candlelight demonstrators and the national flag demonstrators were
both participatory but had completely different attitudes toward democracy.
This again confirms our finding that Korean democracy is pressured by strong
participatory orientations on the one hand and populist non-democratic
aspirations on the other. This is why Korean democracy has not been able
to be institutionalized and remains unstable. It appears that the contentious
style of Korean democracy is congruent with a mass political culture charac-
terized by the interaction of these two conflicting forces: the participatory
democrats and the populist non-democrats.
The final question remains: Who are the participatory democrats and the
populist non-democrats? Direct observation of the candlelight protests and
the national flag counter-demonstrations suggests that the two groups have
opposite backgrounds. Is this simple inference valid? Table 2 shows the
distribution of the participatory democrats and the populist non-democrats
across six variables: generation, education, region, income, ideology, and
party identification.55
The socioeconomic and political differences between participatory demo-
crats and populist non-democrats are evident. Among the six variables, the
differences in generation, ideology, and party identification stand out. Partic-
ipatory democrats tend to be younger, progressive, and Democratic Party
supporters. Only a small minority are older, conservative, or Saenuri (Liberty)
Party supporters. Education is another factor that strongly distinguishes
participatory democrats from populist non-democrats. Among those with
a college degree and above, 61% are participatory democrats, while only
17% are populist non-democrats. We find the opposite pattern in the least
educated category, where populist non-democrats outnumber participatory
democrats 47% to 28%. Concerning income, the mode for participatory
democrats is the middle-income category, while for populist non-democrats
it is the low-income segment. Finally, participatory democrats are relatively
54. Chris Sommerfeldt, “Deadly Protests Break Out after the Removal of South Korea’s Im-
peached President,” New York Daily News, March 10, 2017.
55. Because we are interested in identifying their socioeconomic and political backgrounds, we
use descriptive statistics rather than regression analysis.
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more prevalent in Jeolla and the capital area (Seoul and Gyeonggi region) than
in Chungcheong, although the difference is small. However, populist non-
democrats are smallest in number in the capital region. Consistent with the
table 2. Socioeconomic and Political Differences of Participatory Democrats and
Populist Non-Democrats in South Korea
Participatory democrats Populist non-democrats
Generation
19–39 65% 21%
40–59 50% 24%
60þ 29% 35%
Education
Less than high school 28% 47%
High school and junior college 45% 31%
College and above 61% 17%
Region
Seoul/Gyeonggi/Others 54% 22%
Chungcheong 45% 32%
Jeolla 57% 25%
Gyeongsang 47% 28%
Monthly income
Less than US$ 2,715 42% 34%
US$ 2,715–4,515 57% 22%
US$ 4,525 þ 54% 20%
Ideology
Conservative 31% 32%
Center 52% 26%
Progressive 70% 17%
Party Identification
Saenuri 30% 29%
Democratic 74% 12%
Independent and minorities 55% 26%
SOURCE: By authors
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expectation of modernization and cognitive mobilization theories,56 these
findings explain why the candlelight protests were particularly strong and
highly concentrated in Seoul and why young, educated, and progressive citi-
zens were the main participants.57
What do these results lead us to infer about Korean democracy? The
positive side is that Korean democracy is nearly free from breakdowns. The
public’s support for democracy has steadily risen over time, and the rejection of
its alternatives remains solid. Corroborating the findings of previous studies,58
85% of our respondents reject authoritarianism, and unconditional support for
democracy is about 70%, high enough to prevent a slide back to authoritar-
ianism. As demonstrated in the latest candlelight protests, these cultural forces
have saved democracy at the regime level from its deconsolidation in Korea.
But there is also a negative side. Korean representative democracy is likely
to continue to be unstable and contentious. Unlike in the Western democ-
racies, where representative government and other democratic institutions
have been institutionalized over centuries,59 the system of representative
democracy is not yet institutionalized and lacks solid social, historical roots
in Korea. Korean democracy devolved into dictatorship shortly after its
beginning, and authoritarian rule lasted for several decades. And Korean
representative democracy is now being challenged by the participatory aspira-
tions of both democratic and non-democratic groups.
Our findings suggest that steady social and economic modernization in-
creases the participatory aspirations of massed citizens, but it is limited in
strengthening the feeble representative institutions in Korea. Though partic-
ipatory and democratic orientations are prevalent among young, educated,
middle-class citizens living in urban capital areas, the weak foundations of
representative agencies, such as political parties and interest groups, have
been an enduring problem in Korea.60 Together, participatory mass culture
and feeble representative institutions have kept Korean democracy conten-
tious and unstable.
56. Dalton, Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices; Dalton and Welzel, Civic Culture
Transformed.
57. Lee, “Who and Why Participated.”
58. See e.g. Park and Chu, “Trends in Attitudes.”
59. Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French
Revolution (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011); Stasavage, “Representation and Consent.”
60. Kim, “‘Contentious Democracy’”; Oh, “Strong State and Strong Civil Society.”
292  ASIAN SURVEY 59:2
CONCLUSION
This research began with a question of why Korean democracy has faced
large-scale protests and remained unstable despite three decades of demo-
cratic advancements and steady economic development. Taking the cultural
approach and using data from a nationwide survey conducted in 2015, we find
that public support for democracy and participation is dominant among
ordinary Koreans. This democratic and participatory culture is especially
pronounced among the post-transition generations and the educated seg-
ments of its citizenry.
These findings have important implications for Korean politics and com-
parative democratization. Prior studies of Korean politics attribute the con-
tentious nature of Korean democracy to ineffective representative
institutions, especially the parties.61 According to them, strong social move-
ments have persisted because political parties have failed to expand social
bases and channel various interests in representative politics. However, this
study has demonstrated that under-institutionalized parties are just part of
the story of unstable Korean democracy. The other side, which has received
less attention, is the rise of participatory orientations among massed citizens
due to steady social and economic modernization.
Furthermore, the existing literature on Korean politics is limited in ex-
plaining how civic activism has been reinforced despite the decline of civic
associationalism since the 2000s. Although studies have identified specific
actors in recent social movements, they are not able to address the resilient
persistence of strong civic activism. Our analysis suggests that the tradition of
civic activism has been reinforced by participatory mass culture rather than
the organizational capacity of civic associations.
With regard to comparative democratization, this in-depth study of Korean
democracy raises an issue about the relationship between modernization and
democratic stability. According to modernization theory, social and economic
development is conducive to stable democracy.62 However, our findings sug-
gest that this does not hold in Korea, which is a hyper-modern society. Even
since the transition period, Korean democracy has remained unstable, with
under-institutionalized parties and party system, despite the country’s steady
61. Lee, “Diverging Patterns”; Kim, “‘Contentious Democracy’.”
62. Diamond, “East Asia amid the Receding Tide”; Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man: the Social
Bases of Politics (New York: Doubleday, 1960).
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economic development and social modernization.63 Thus, social and eco-
nomic development contributes to the survival of Korean democracy, but it
does not help institutionalize and stabilize it, while inspiring participatory
attitudes among young, educated, and urban citizens.64
Finally, related to the previous point that successful modernization does
not necessarily translate into stable democracy, our analysis raises the Hun-
tingtonian concern that participation must be balanced with institutionaliza-
tion, or political instability is inevitable.65 We believe that this explains why
many new democracies remain unstable, with an increasing number of pro-
tests in recent years.66 Over the last three decades, average GDP per capita has
increased threefold worldwide, and more than 100 countries have introduced
elections and allowed multiparty competition. Yet, many of the new democ-
racies do not perform well and suffer from weak institutionalization of rep-
resentative politics, producing a “democratic deficit.”67 Moreover, because
world GDP per capita started to decline in 2014 and inequality of income as
well as assets has worsened, it is reasonable to conclude that the political
instability of new democracies is likely to spread in the near future.
63. Aurel Croissant and Philip Vo¨lkel, “Party SystemTypes and Party System Institutionalization,”
Party Politics 18:2 (2012): 235–65; Olli Hellmann, “Party System Institutionalization without Parties:
Evidence from Korea,” Journal of East Asian Studies 14:1 (2014): 53–84.
64. Dalton, Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices; Dalton and Shin, “Growing up
Democratic”; Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,”
World Politics 49:2 (1997): 155–83.
65. Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1968).
66. Carothers and Youngs, Complexities of Global Protests.
67. Norris, Democratic Deficit.
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